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On the existence of weak subgame perfect
equilibria
Ve´ronique Bruye`re1, Ste´phane Le Roux2,⋆,†, Arno Pauly2,⋆,‡, and
Jean-Franc¸ois Raskin2,∗
1 De´partement d’informatique, Universite´ de Mons (UMONS), Belgium
2 De´partement d’informatique, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium
Abstract. We study multi-player turn-based games played on (poten-
tially infinite) directed graphs. An outcome is assigned to every play of
the game. Each player has a preference relation on the set of outcomes
which allows him to compare plays. We focus on the recently introduced
notion of weak subgame perfect equilibrium (weak SPE). This is a vari-
ant of the classical notion of SPE, where players who deviate can only
use strategies deviating from their initial strategy in a finite number of
histories. Having an SPE in a game implies having a weak SPE but the
contrary is generally false.
We propose general conditions on the structure of the game graph and
on the preference relations of the players that guarantee the existence of
a weak SPE, that additionally is finite-memory. From this general result,
we derive two large classes of games for which there always exists a weak
SPE: (i) the games with a finite-range outcome function, and (ii) the
games with a finite underlying graph and a prefix-independent outcome
function. For the second class, we identify conditions on the preference
relations that guarantee memoryless strategies for the weak SPE.
1 Introduction
Subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) are a core solution concept for sequential
games. For infinite duration games, they only exist in restricted cases, though.
A weaker variant of SPE, weak SPE was recently introduced in [5]. While an
SPE must be resistant to any unilateral deviation of one player, a weak SPE
must be resistant to such deviations where the deviating strategy differs from
the original one on a finite number of histories only, or, equivalently, a single
history. The latter class of deviating strategies is a well-known notion that for
instance appears in the proof of Kuhn’s theorem [19] with the one-step deviation
property.
There are games for which there exists a weak SPE but no SPE [5,26]. The
notion of weak SPE is important for several reasons (more details are given
⋆ Author supported by ERC Starting Grant (279499: inVEST).
† Le Roux has since moved to TU Darmstadt, Germany.
‡ Pauly has since moved to Swansea University, UK.
in the related work discussed below). First, for the large class of games with
upper-semicontinuous payoff functions and for games played on finite trees, the
notions of SPE and weak SPE are equivalent. Second, it is a central technical
ingredient used to reason on SPEs as shown in [5] and [14]. Third, being immune
to strategies that finitely deviate from the initial strategy profile may be sufficient
from the perspective of synthesis (see more below).
In this paper, we provide the following contributions. First, we identify a
general class of games played on potentially infinite graphs and prove that these
games always admit weak SPE (Theorem 1). The proof of our result has an
algorithmic flavour, and proceeds via transfinite induction. The weak SPEs we
construct require only finite memory to execute, meaning that the prescribed
action at any history depends only on the current vertex and on the state of
some finite automaton. Second, starting from this general existence result, we
prove the existence of a weak SPE:
– for games on infinite trees with a finite number of outcomes (Theorem 2,
reproving a result from [14]);
– for games with a finite underlying graph and a prefix-independent outcome
function (Theorem 4).
Additionally, in the second result, we identify conditions on the players’ outcome
preferences that guarantee the existence of a weak SPE composed of uniform
memoryless strategies only (Theorem 5).
Related work The concept of SPE has been first introduced and studied by
the game theory community. In [19], Kuhn proves the existence of SPEs in games
played on finite trees. This result has been generalized in several ways. All games
with a continuous real-valued outcome function and a finitely branching tree
always have an SPE [22] (the special case with finitely many players is first
established in [16]). In [14] (resp. [24]), the authors prove that there always exists
an SPE for games with a finite number of players and with a real-valued outcome
function that is upper-semicontinuous (resp. lower-semicontinuous) and has finite
range. The result of [24] is extended to an infinite number of players in [15].
In [22], it is proved using Borel determinacy that all two-player games with
antagonistic preferences over finitely many outcomes and a Borel-measurable
outcome function have an SPE. In [21], Le Roux shows that all games where the
preferences over finitely many outcomes are free of some “bad pattern” and the
outcome function is ∆02 measurable (a low level in the Borel hierarchy) have an
SPE.
In part of the aforementioned works, the equivalence between SPEs and weak
SPEs is implicitly used as a proof technique: in a finite setting in [19], in a
continuous setting in [16], and in a lower-semicontinuous setting in [14]. In the
latter reference, it is implicitly proven that all games with a finite range real-
valued outcome function always have a weak SPE (which appears to be an SPE
when the outcome function is additionally lower-semicontinuous).We obtain this
result here as a consequence of a more general theorem, with a proof of a more
algorithmic nature.
The concept of SPE and other solution concepts for multi-player non zero-
sum games have been considered recently by the theoretical computer commu-
nity, see [2] for a survey. The existence of SPEs (and thus weak SPEs) is estab-
lished in [27] for games played on graphs by a finite number of players and with
Borel Boolean objectives. In [5], weak SPEs are introduced as a technical tool
for showing the existence of SPEs in quantitative reachability games played on
finite weighted graphs. An algorithm is also provided for the construction of a
(finite-memory) weak SPE that appears to be an SPE for this particular class
of games. In this paper, we give several existence results that are orthogonal to
the results obtained in [5] as they are concerned with possibly infinite graphs or
prefix-independent outcome functions.
Other refinements of Nash equilibria (NE) are studied. Let us mention the
secure equilibria for two players first introduced in [9] and then used for reactive
synthesis in [12]. These equilibria are generalized to multiple players in [13] or
to quantitative objectives in [8], see also a variant called Doomsday equilibrium
in [10]. Like NEs, they are subject to possible non-credible threats. Other al-
ternatives to NE are provided by the notion of admissible strategy introduced
in [1], with computational aspects studied in [4], and potential for synthesis
studied in [3]. Note that these notions are free, like (weak) SPEs, of non-credible
threats. Finally, in [20], the authors introduce the notion of cooperative and non-
cooperative rational synthesis as a general framework where rationality can be
specified by either NE, or SPE, or the notion of dominating strategies. In all cases
except [8] and [13], the proposed solution concepts are not guaranteed to exist,
hence results concern mostly algorithmic techniques to decide their existence,
instead of general conditions for existence as in this paper.
Applications to reactive synthesis Games played on graphs have a large
number of applications in theoretical computer science. One particularly impor-
tant application is reactive synthesis [23], i.e. the design of a controller that
guarantees a good behavior of a reactive system evolving in a possibly hostile
environment. One classical model proposed for the synthesis problem is the no-
tion of two-player zero-sum game played on a graph. One player is the reactive
system and the other one is the environment; the vertices of the graph model
their possible states and the edges model their possible actions. Interactions be-
tween the players generate an infinite play in the graph which model behaviors
of the system within its environment. As one cannot assume cooperation of the
environment, the objectives of the two players are considered to be opposite.
Constructing a controller for the system then means devising a winning strategy
for the player modeling it. Reality is often more subtle and the environment
is usually not fully adversarial as it has its own objective, meaning that the
game should be non zero-sum. Moreover instead of two players, we could con-
sider the more general situation of several players modeling different interacting
systems/environments each of them with its own objective.
This has lead to an exploration of a variety of solution concepts for sequential
games from the perspective of theoretical computer science (see survey [6]). Weak
SPE have the benefit of allowing less unreasonable threats than Nash equilibria,
but existing in more cases than SPE. We can even imagine ruling out infinite
deviations by letting a meta-agent punish every one-shot deviation with a (low)
fixed probability. A player using an infinitely-deviating strategy will thus be
punished by the meta-agent with probability one. Protocols like BitTorrent use
similar ideas: every deviant user is temporarily denied suitable bandwidth (see
Chapter Bandwidth Trading as Incentive in [25] for details).
Structure of the paper In Section 2, we recall the useful notions of game,
strategy and weak SPE. In Section 3, we present our general conditions that
guarantee the existence of a weak SPE. From this general existence result, we
derive two large classes of games with a weak SPE: games with a finite-range
outcome function in Section 4, and games with a finite underlying graph and
a prefix-independent outcome function in Section 5. In Section 6 we provide
an example of a game without weak SPE demonstrating limitations to possible
extensions of our main theorem.
An extended abstract omitting most proofs has appeared as [7].
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the useful notions of game, strategy, and weak subgame
perfect equilibrium. We illustrate these notions with examples.
2.1 Games
We consider multi-player turn-based games such that an outcome is assigned to
every play. Each player has a preference relation on the set of outcomes which
allows him to compare plays.
Definition 1. A game is a tuple G = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E,O, µ, (≺i)i∈Π) where:
– Π is a set of players,
– V is a set of vertices and E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges, such that w.l.o.g.
each vertex has at least one outgoing edge,
– (Vi)i∈Π is a partition of V such that Vi is the set of vertices controlled by
player i ∈ Π,
– O is a set of outcomes and µ : V ω → O is an outcome function,
– ≺i ⊆ O ×O is a preference relation for player i ∈ Π.
In this definition the underlying graph (V,E) can be infinite (that is, of
arbitrarily cardinality), as well as the set Π of players and the set O of outcomes.
A play of G is an infinite (countable) sequence ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ V ω of vertices
such that (ρi, ρi+1) ∈ E for all i ∈ N. Histories of G are finite sequences h =
h0 . . . hn ∈ V + defined in the same way. We often use notation hv to mention
the last vertex v ∈ V of the history. Usually histories are non empty, but in
specific situations it will be useful to consider the empty history ǫ. The set of
plays is denoted by Plays and the set of histories (ending with a vertex in Vi)
by Hist (resp. by Histi).
3 A prefix (resp. suffix ) of a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . is a
finite sequence ρ≤n = ρ0 . . . ρn (resp. infinite sequence ρ≥n = ρnρn+1 . . .). We
use notation h < ρ when a history h is prefix of a play ρ. When an initial
vertex v0 ∈ V is fixed, we call (G, v0) an initialized game. In this case, plays
and histories are supposed to start in v0, and we use notations Plays(v0) and
Hist(v0). In this article, we often unravel the graph of the game (G, v0) from
the initial vertex v0, which yields an infinite tree rooted at v0.
The outcome function assigns an outcome µ(ρ) ∈ O to each play ρ ∈ V ω. It
is prefix-independent if µ(hρ) = µ(ρ) for all histories h and play ρ. A preference
relation ≺i ⊆ O × O is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation. It allows
for player i to compare two plays ρ, ρ′ ∈ V ω with respect to their outcome:
µ(ρ) ≺i µ(ρ′) means that player i prefers ρ′ to ρ. In this paper we restrict to
linear preferences. (It is w.l.o.g. since the preference properties that we use are
preserved by linear extension). We write o i o′ when o ≺i o′ or o = o′; notice
that o ⊀i o
′ if and only if o′ i o. We sometimes use notation ≺v instead of ≺i
when vertex v ∈ Vi is controlled by player i.
Example 1. Let us mention some classical classes of games where the set of
outcomes O is a subset of (R ∪ {+∞,−∞})Π, and for all player i ∈ Π , ≺i
is the usual ordering < on R ∪ {+∞,−∞} on the outcome i-th components.
In other words, each player i has a real-valued payoff function µi : Plays →
R∪{+∞,−∞}. The outcome function of the game is then equal to µ = (µi)i∈Π ,
and for all i ∈ Π , µ(ρ) ≺i µ(ρ′) whenever µi(ρ) < µi(ρ′).
Games with Boolean objectives are such that µi : Plays → {0, 1} where 1
(resp. 0) means that the play is won (resp. lost) by player i. Classical objec-
tives are Borel objectives including ω-regular objectives, like reachability, Bu¨chi,
parity, aso [18]. Prefix-independence of µi holds in the case of Bu¨chi and parity
objectives, but not for reachability objective.
We have quantitative objectives when µi : Plays→ R∪ {+∞,−∞} replaces
µi : Plays → {0, 1}. Usually, such a µi is defined from a weight function wi :
E → R that assigns a weight to each edge. Classical examples of µi are limsup
and mean-payoff functions [11], that is4,
– limsup: µi(ρ) = lim supk→∞ wi(ρk, ρk+1)
– mean-payoff : µi(ρ) = lim supn→∞
∑n
k=0
wi(ρk,ρk+1)
n
2.2 Strategies
Let (G, v0) be an initialized game. A strategy σ for player i in (G, v0) is a function
σ : Histi(v0)→ V assigning to each history hv ∈ Histi(v0) a vertex v′ = σ(hv)
such that (v, v′) ∈ E. A strategy σ of player i is positional if it only depends
on the last vertex of the history, i.e. σ(hv) = σ(v) for all hv ∈ Histi(v0). It is a
finite-memory strategy if it can be encoded by a deterministic Moore machine
M = (M,m0, αU , αN ) where M is a finite set of states (the memory of the
3 Indexing P laysG or HistG with G allows to recall the related game G.
4 The limit inferior can be used instead of the limit superior.
strategy), m0 ∈ M is an initial memory state, αU : M × V → M is an update
function, and αN :M×Vi → V is a next-move function.5 Such a machine defines
a strategy σ such that σ(hv) = αN (α̂U (m0, h), v) for all histories hv ∈ Histi(v0),
where α̂U extends αU to histories as expected. The memory size of σ is then the
size |M | of M. In particular σ is positional when it has memory size one.
The previous definitions of (positional, finite-memory) strategy are given for
an initialized game (G, v0). We call uniform every positional strategy σ of player i
defined for all hv ∈ Histi (instead of Histi(v0)), that is, when σ is a positional
strategy in all initialized games (G, v), v ∈ V .
A play ρ is consistent with a strategy σ of player i if ρn+1 = σ(ρ≤n) for
all n such that ρn ∈ Vi. A strategy profile is a tuple σ¯ = (σi)i∈Π of strategies,
where each σi is a strategy of player i. It is called positional (resp. finite-memory
with memory size bounded by c, uniform) if all σi, i ∈ Π , are positional (resp.
finite-memory with memory size bounded by c, uniform). Given an initial vertex
v0, such a strategy profile determines a unique play of (G, v0) that is consistent
with all the strategies. This play induced by σ¯ in (G, v0) is denoted by 〈σ¯〉v0 and
we say that σ¯ has outcome µ(〈σ¯〉v0).
Let σ¯ be a strategy profile. When all players stick to their own strategy
except player i that shifts from σi to σ
′
i, we denote by (σ
′
i, σ¯−i) the derived
strategy profile, and by 〈σ′i, σ¯−i〉v0 the induced play in (G, v0). We say that σ
′
i
is a deviating strategy from σi. When σi and σ
′
i only differ on a finite number
of histories (resp. on v0), we say that σ
′
i is a finitely-deviating (resp. one-shot
deviating) strategy from σi. One-shot deviating strategies is a well-known notion
that for instance appears in the proof of Kuhn’s theorem [19] with the one-step
deviation property. Finitely-deviating strategies have been introduced in [5].
2.3 Variants of subgame perfect equilibria
In this section we recall the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and
its variants. Let us first recall the classical notion of Nash equilibrium (NE).
Informally, a strategy profile σ¯ in an initialized game (G, v0) is an NE if no
player has an incentive to deviate (with respect to his preference relation), if the
other players stick to their strategies.
Definition 2. Given an initialized game (G, v0), a strategy profile σ¯ = (σi)i∈Π
of (G, v0) is a Nash equilibrium if for all players i ∈ Π, for all strategies σ
′
i of
player i, we have µ(〈σ¯〉v0) ⊀i µ(〈σ
′
i, σ¯−i〉v0 ).
When µ(〈σ¯〉v0) ≺i µ(〈σ
′
i, σ¯−i〉v0), we say that σ
′
i is a profitable deviation for
player i w.r.t. σ¯.
The notion of subgame perfect equilibrium is a refinement of NE. In order
to define it, we need to introduce the following concepts. Given a game G =
(Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E, µ, (≺i)i∈Π) and a history h ∈ Hist, we denote by G|h the
5 Moore machines are usually defined for finite sets V of vertices. We here allow infinite
sets V .
game (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E, µ|h, (≺i)i∈Π) where µ|h(ρ) = µ(hρ) for all plays of G|h
6,
and we say that G|h is a subgame of G. Given an initialized game (G, v0) and
a history hv ∈ Hist(v0), the initialized game (G|h, v) is called the subgame of
(G, v0) with history hv. In particular (G, v0) is a subgame of itself with history
hv0 such that h = ǫ. Given a strategy σ of player i in (G, v0), the strategy σ|h
in (G|h, v) is defined as σ|h(h
′) = σ(hh′) for all histories h′ ∈ Histi(v). Given a
strategy profile σ¯ in (G, v0), we use notation σ¯|h for (σi|h)i∈Π , and 〈σ¯|h〉v is the
play induced by σ¯|h in the subgame (G|h, v).
We can now recall the classical notion of subgame perfect equilibrium: an
SPE is a strategy profile in an initialized game that induces an NE in each of
its subgames. Two variants of SPE, called weak SPE and very weak SPE, are
proposed in [5] such that no player has an incentive to deviate in any subgame
using finitely deviating strategies and one-shot deviating strategies respectively
(instead of any deviating strategy).
Definition 3. Given an initialized game (G, v0), a strategy profile σ¯ of (G, v0)
is a (weak, very weak resp.) subgame perfect equilibrium if for all histories
hv ∈ Hist(v0), for all players i ∈ Π, for all (finitely, one-shot resp.) deviating
strategies σ′i from σi|h of player i in the subgame (G|h, v), we have µ(〈σ¯|h〉v) ⊀i
µ(〈σ′i, σ¯−i|h〉v).
Trivially, every SPE is a weak SPE, and every weak SPE is a very weak SPE.
Proposition 1 ([5]). Let σ¯ be a strategy profile in (G, v0). Then σ¯ is a weak
SPE iff σ¯ is a very weak SPE. There exists an initialized game (G, v0) with a
weak SPE but no SPE.
v0 v1v2 v3
Fig. 1. A initialized game (G, v0) with a (very) weak SPE and no SPE.
Example 2 ([5]). Consider the two-player game (G, v0) in Figure 1 such that
player 1 (resp. player 2) controls vertices v0, v2, v3 (resp. vertex v1). The set O of
outcomes is equal to {o1, o2, o3}, and the outcome function is prefix-independent
such that µ((v0v1)
ω) = o1, µ(v
ω
2 ) = o2, and µ(v
ω
3 ) = o3. The preference relation
for player 1 (resp. player 2) is o1 ≺1 o2 ≺1 o3 (resp. o2 ≺2 o3 ≺2 o1).
It is known that this game has no SPE [26]. Nevertheless the positional
strategy profile σ¯ depicted with thick edges is a very weak SPE, and thus a weak
SPE by Proposition 1. Let us give some explanation. Due to the simple form of
6 In this article, we will always use notation µ(hρ) instead of µ|h(ρ).
the game, only two cases are to be treated. Consider first the subgame (G|h, v0)
with h ∈ (v0v1)∗, and the one-shot deviating strategy σ′1 from σ1|h such that
σ′1(v0) = v2. Then 〈σ¯|h〉v0 = v0v1v
ω
3 and 〈σ
′
1, σ2|h〉v0 = v0v
ω
2 with respective
outcomes o3 and o2, showing that σ
′
1 is not a profitable deviation for player 1
in (G|h, v0). Now in the subgame (G|h, v1) with h ∈ (v0v1)
∗v0, the one-shot
deviating strategy from σ2|h such that σ
′
2(v1) = v0 is not profitable for player 2
in (G|h, v1) because 〈σ¯|h〉v1 = v1v
ω
3 and 〈σ1|h, σ
′
2〉v1 = v1v0v1v
ω
3 with the same
outcome o3.
Notice that σ¯ is not an SPE. Indeed the strategy σ′2 such that σ
′
2(hv1) = v0
for all h, is infinitely deviating from σ2, and is a profitable deviation for player 2
in (G, v0) since 〈σ1, σ
′
2〉v0 = (v0v1)
ω with outcome o1.
3 General conditions for the existence of weak SPEs
In this section, we propose general conditions to guarantee the existence of weak
SPEs. In the next sections, from this result, we will derive two interesting large
families of games always having a weak SPE.
Theorem 1. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game with a subset L ⊆ V of vertices
called leaves with only one outgoing edge (l, l) for all l ∈ L. Suppose that:
1. for all v ∈ V , there exists a play ρ = hlω for some h ∈ Hist(v) and l ∈ L,
2. for all plays ρ = hlω with h ∈ Hist(v) and l ∈ L, µ(ρ) = µ(lω),
3. the set of outcomes OL = {µ(lω) | l ∈ L} is finite.
Then there always exists a weak SPE σ¯ in (G, v0). Moreover, σ¯ is finite-memory
with memory size bounded by |OL|.
Let us comment the hypotheses. The first condition means that from each
vertex v of the game there is a leaf reachable from v; in particular L is not empty.
The second condition expresses prefix-independence of the outcome function
restricted to plays eventually looping in a leaf l ∈ L. The last condition means
that even if there is an infinite number of leaves, the set of outcomes assigned by
µ to plays eventually looping in L is finite. The next example describes a family
of games satisfying the conditions of Theorem 1.
Example 3. For each natural number n ≥ 3, we build a game Gn with n players,
2n vertices, 3n edges, and n+1 outcomes. The set of players is Π = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and the set of vertices is V = {v1, . . . , vn, l1, . . . ln} such that Vi = {vi, li} for
all i ∈ Π . The edges are (v1, v2), (v2, v3), . . . , (vn, v1), and (vi, li), (li, li) for all
i ∈ Π . The game G4 is depicted in Figure 2. The set O of outcomes is equal
to {o1, . . . , on,⊥}, and the outcome function is prefix-independent such that
µ((v1v2 . . . vn)
ω) = ⊥ and µ(lωi ) = oi for all i ∈ Π . Each player i has a preference
relation ≺i satisfying ⊥ ≺i oi−1 ≺i oi ≺i oj for all j ∈ Π \ {i − 1, i} (with the
convention that o0 = on).
Each game (Gn, v1) satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 1 with L = {l1, . . . , ln}
and thus has a finite-memory weak SPE. Such a strategy profile σ¯ is depicted
v1 v2
v3v4
l1 l2
l3l4
Fig. 2. Game G4
in Figure 3 for n = 4 (see the thick edges on the unravelling of G4 from the
initial vertex v1) and can be easily generalized to every n ≥ 3. One verifies that
this profile is a very weak SPE, and thus a weak SPE by Proposition 1. For all
i ∈ Π , the strategy σi of player i is finite-memory with a memory size equal
to n − 1. Intuitively, along (v1 . . . vn)ω, player i repeatedly produces one move
(vi, li) followed by n−2 moves (vi, vi+1). Hence the memory states of the Moore
machine for σi are counters from 1 to n − 1. The Moore machine for σ1 in the
game (G4, v1) is depicted in Figure 4 (with M = {1, 2, 3}, m0 = 1, and the
update and next-move functions indicated by the edges).
v1 v2 v3 v4 v1 v2 v3 v4 v1 v2 v3 v4 v1
l1 l2 l3 l4 l1 l2 l3 l4 l1 l2 l3 l4 l1
Fig. 3. Weak SPE in (G4, v1)
1 2
3
v1/l1
v1/v2v1/v2
v2, v3, v4 v2, v3, v4
v2, v3, v4
Fig. 4. The Moore machine for σ1
Let us now proceed to the proof of Theorem 1. Recall that it is enough to
prove the existence of a very weak SPE by Proposition 1. The proof idea is
the following one. Initially, for each vertex v, we accept all plays ρ = hlω with
h ∈ Hist(v) and l ∈ L as potential plays induced by a very weak SPE in the
initialized game (G, v). We thus label each v by the set of outcomes µ(lω) for such
leaves l (recall that µ(ρ) = µ(lω) by the second condition of Theorem 1). Notice
that this labeling is finite (resp. not empty) by the third (resp. first) condition
of the theorem. Step after step, we are going to remove some outcomes from the
vertex labelings by a Remove operation followed by an Adjust operation. The
Remove operation removes an outcome o from the labeling of a given vertex
v when there exists an edge (v, v′) for which o ≺v o
′ for all outcomes o′ that
label v′. Indeed o cannot be the outcome of a play induced by a very weak SPE
since the player who controls v will choose the move (v, v′) to get a preferable
outcome o′. Now it may happen that for another vertex u having o in its labeling,
all potential plays induced by a very weak SPE from u with outcome o necessarily
cross vertex v. As o has been removed from the labeling of v, these potential
plays do no longer survive and o will also be removed from the labeling of u
by the Adjust operation. Repeatedly applying these two operations converge to
a fixpoint for which we will prove non-emptiness (this is the difficult part of
the proof, non-emptiness will be obtained by maintaining three invariants, see
Lemma 1). From this fixpoint, for each vertex v and each outcome o of the
resulting labeling of v, there exists a play ρv,o = hl
ω with outcome o for some
h ∈ Hist(v) and l ∈ L. We can thus build a very weak SPE σ¯ in (G, v0) as
follows. The construction of σ¯ is done step by step: (i) initially σ¯ is partially
defined such that 〈σ¯〉v0 = ρv0,o0 for some o0; (ii) then in the subgame (G|h, v)
such that 〈σ¯|h〉v = ρv,o, if the player who controls v chooses the move (v, v
′) in a
one-shot deviation, then there exists ρv′,o′ such that o ⊀v o
′ by definition of the
fixpoint, and we thus extend the construction of σ¯ such that 〈σ¯|hv〉v′ = ρv′,o′ .
Let us now go into the details of the proof. For each l ∈ L, we denote by ol
the outcome µ(lω). Recall that for all ρ = hlω we have µ(ρ) = ol by the second
hypothesis of the theorem. For each v ∈ V , we denote by Succ(v) the set of
successors of v distinct from v, that is, the vertices v′ 6= v such that (v, v′) ∈ E.
Notice that the leaves l are the vertices with only one outgoing edge (l, l). Thus,
by definition, Succ(v) = ∅ for all v ∈ L and Succ(v) 6= ∅ for all v ∈ V \ L.
The labeling λα(v) of the vertices v of G by subsets of OL is an inductive
process on the ordinal α. Initially (step α = 0), each v ∈ V is labeled by:
λ0(v) = {ol ∈ OL | there exists a play hl
ω with h ∈ Hist(v) and l ∈ L}.
(In particular λ0(l) = {ol} for all l ∈ L). By the first hypothesis of the theorem,
λ0(v) 6= ∅. Let us introduce some additional terminology. At step α, when there
is a path7 π from v to v′ in G, we say that π is (o, α)-labeled if o ∈ λα(u) for all
the vertices u of π. Thus initially, we have a (ol, 0)-labeled path from v to l for
each ol ∈ λ0(v). For v ∈ V , let
mα(v) = max≺v{min≺vλα(v
′) | v′ ∈ Succ(v)}
7 By path, we mean a finite path
with the convention that mα(v) = ⊤ if Succ(v) = ∅ or if λα(v′) = ∅ for all
v′ ∈ Succ(v).8 When mα(v) 6= ⊤, we says that v′ ∈ Succ(v) realizes mα(v) if
mα(v) = min≺v λα(v
′). Notice that even if Succ(v) could be infinite, there are
finitely many sets λα(v
′) since OL is finite. This justifies our use of max≺v and
min≺v operators in the definition of mα(v).
We alternate between applying Remove and Adjust to the current labeling.
More formally, we define the labeling λα inductively
9. In the following, γ is
always assumed to be a limit ordinal and n to be a natural number.
– Defining λγ+2n+1 via Remove operation
Let α := γ + 2n + 1. Test if for some v ∈ V , there exist o ∈ λα−1(v) and
v′ ∈ Succ(v) such that
o ≺v o
′, for all o′ ∈ λα−1(v
′).
If such a v exists, then λα(v) = λα−1(v) \ {o}, and λα(u) = λα−1(u) for the
other vertices u 6= v. Otherwise λα(u) = λα−1(u) for all u ∈ V .
– Defining λγ+2n+2 via Adjust operation
Let α := γ + 2n+ 2. Suppose that λα−1(v) = λα−2(v) \ {o} at the previous
step. For all u ∈ V such that o ∈ λα−1(u), test if there exists a (o, α − 1)-
labeled path from u to some l ∈ L. If yes, then λα(u) = λα−1(u), otherwise
λα(u) = λα−1(u) \ {o}. For all u ∈ V such that o 6∈ λα−1(u), let λα(u) =
λα−1(u).
Suppose that λα−1(v) = λα−2(v) for all v ∈ V at the previous step, then
λα(v) = λα−1(v) for all v ∈ V .
– Defining λγ via intersection
Let λγ(v) = ∩β<γλβ(v) for all v ∈ V .
For each v, the sequence (λα(v))α is nonincreasing (w.r.t. set inclusion), and
thus the sequence (mα(v))α is nondecreasing (w.r.t. ≺v). Moreover, the sequence
(λα)α is nonincreasing w.r.t. pointwise set inclusion. Thus, there exists some
ordinal α∗ such that λα∗ = λβ for all β > α
∗. By inspecting the definition, we
see that it suffices to check that λα∗ = λα∗+1 = λα∗+2 in order to see that α
∗ is
a fixed point. If V is finite, such a fixed point is reached after at most 2|OL| · |V |
steps. The central challenge is to show that this fixed point is non-empty in each
component.
Notice that for all leaves l ∈ L and all steps α, we have λα(l) = {ol}.
Lemma 1. There exists an ordinal α∗ such that
λα∗(v) = λα∗+1(v) = λα∗+2(v) for all v ∈ V.
Moreover, λα∗(v) 6= ∅ for all v ∈ V .
8 We suppose that o ≺v ⊤ for all o ∈ OL.
9 Note that our definition as written makes non-deterministic choices. This is imma-
terial for our purposes, but could be determinized by demanding a well-ordering of
the vertex set and the outcomes.
To be able to prove that λα∗(v) 6= ∅, we introduce three invariants for which
we will prove that they are initially true (Lemma 2) and remain true after each
step α (Lemmata 3,4,5). The non emptiness of λα∗(v) will follow from the second
invariant.
INV1 For v ∈ V , we have for all v′ ∈ Succ(v) that
{o ∈ λα(v
′) | mα(v) v o} ⊆ λα(v).
In particular, when mα(v) 6= ⊤, for each v′ that realizes mα(v), we have
λα(v
′) ⊆ λα(v). (1)
INV2 For v ∈ V , λα(v) 6= ∅.
INV3 For v ∈ V , there exists a path from v to some l ∈ L such that for all
vertices u in this path, λα(u) ⊆ λα(v).
Lemma 2. All three invariants are true for λ0.
Proof. Consider v ∈ V at the initial step α = 0. By hypothesis there is a path
from v to some l ∈ L. Thus λα(v) 6= ∅ and INV2 is true. Moreover, for all
v′ ∈ Succ(v), we have λα(v′) ⊆ λα(v) by the initial labeling, and thus INV1 and
INV3 are also true. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. All three invariants are preserved by Remove.
Proof. Consider some α = γ + 2n for limit ordinal γ and n ∈ N such that all
invariants hold for λα. If λα+1 = λα, then trivially, all invariants hold for λα+1.
Otherwise there exist v and o such that λα+1(v) = λα(v) \ {o} and λα+1(u) =
λα(u) for all u 6= v. In particular v /∈ L. For all u ∈ V , we have mα(u) u
mα+1(u), with the particular case mα(v) = mα+1(v).
– Remove cannot violate INV1. We first consider u ∈ V such that u 6= v.
For all u′ ∈ Succ(u), we have
{o′ ∈ λα+1(u
′) | mα+1(u) u o
′}
⊆ {o′ ∈ λα(u′) | mα(u) u o′} since λα+1(u′) ⊆ λα(u′)
and mα(u) u mα+1(u),
⊆ λα(u) by INV1 at step α,
= λα+1(u) as u 6= v.
Let us turn to vertex v. As o ≺v mα(v), the previous inclusions can be
modified as follows. For all v′ ∈ Succ(v), we now have {o′ ∈ λα+1(v′) |
mα+1(v) v o′} ⊆ {o′ ∈ λα(v′) | mα(v) v o′} ⊆ λα(v) \ {o} = λα+1(v).
– Remove cannot violate INV2. We only have to show that λα+1(v) 6= ∅.
As Succ(v) 6= ∅10 and by INV2, we have mα(v) 6= ⊤. Hence there exists
v′ ∈ Succ(v) that realizes mα(v) = mα+1(v). By INV1 and in particular (1)
at step α+ 1, we thus have λα+1(v
′) ⊆ λα+1(v). As λα+1(v′) = λα(v′) 6= ∅,
it follows that λα+1(v) 6= ∅.
10 Recall that v 6∈ L, and that Succ(v) 6= ∅ for all v ∈ V \ L.
– Remove cannot violate INV3. We first consider u 6= v. By INV3, there
exists a path π from u to some l ∈ L such that λα(w) ⊆ λα(u) for all vertices
w in this path. We can keep the path π at step α+1 since λα+1(w) ⊆ λα(w)
for all w in π and λα+1(u) = λα(u).
We now consider vertex v. Consider again v′ ∈ Succ(v) that realizesmα+1(v).
By (1), λα+1(v
′) ⊆ λα+1(v). We know that there exists a path π from v′ to
some l ∈ L such that λα(w) ⊆ λα(v′) for all w in π. This path π augmented
with the edge (v, v′) is the required path for INV3 at step α+ 1 because for
all w in π, we have λα+1(w) ⊆ λα(w) ⊆ λα(v′) = λα+1(v′) ⊆ λα+1(v).
⊓⊔
Lemma 4. All three invariants are preserved by Adjust.
Proof. Let all three invariants hold for α = γ+2n+1 for limit ordinal γ and n ∈
N. Then the preceding step was a Remove step. If λα = λα−1, then λα+1 = λα.
Otherwise, there are v0 ∈ V and an outcome o such that λα(v0) = λα−1(v0)\{o}
and λα(u) = λα−1(u) for all u 6= v0.
For all v ∈ V , either λα+1(v) = λα(v) or λα+1(v) = λα(v)\{o}, andmα(v) v
mα+1(v).
Consider v ∈ V such that o /∈ λα+1(v) and o ∈ λα(v). Then
∀v′ ∈ Succ(v), o 6∈ λα+1(v
′) (2)
Otherwise if o ∈ λα+1(v′) for some v′ ∈ Succ(v), this means that o has not
been removed from λα(v
′), i.e., there exists a (o, α)-labeled path from v′ to some
l ∈ L, and thus also from v to l by using the edge (v, v′). This is in contradiction
with o being removed from λα(v).
– Adjust cannot violate INV1. We first consider v ∈ V such that λα+1(v) =
λα(v). As done for INV1 and Remove, we have for all v
′ ∈ Succ(v) that
{o′ ∈ λα+1(v′) | mα+1(v) v o′} ⊆ {o′ ∈ λα(v′) | mα(v) v o′} ⊆ λα(v) =
λα+1(v).
We now consider v ∈ V such that λα+1(v) 6= λα(v). Let v′ ∈ Succ(v). From
(2), we have {o′ ∈ λα+1(v′) | mα+1(v) v o′} ⊆ {o′ ∈ λα(v′) | mα(v) v
o′} \ {o} ⊆ λα(v) \ {o} = λα+1(v).
– Adjust cannot violate INV2. Assume that for some v ∈ V , λα+1(v) = ∅,
that is, λα(v) = {o}. By INV3, there exists a path π from v to some l ∈ L
such that λα(u) ⊆ λα(v) for all u in π. From λα(v) = {o} and λα(u) 6= ∅
(by INV2), we get λα(u) = {o} for all such u. Therefore, the path π from
v to l is (o, α)-labeled and o cannot be removed from λα(v), showing that
λα+1(v) 6= ∅.
– Adjust cannot violate INV3. Let v ∈ V and by INV3 take a path u1 . . . un
from v = u1 to some l = un with l ∈ L such that λα(ui) ⊆ λα(v) for all i.
Either this path is still valid at step α+ 1, or there exists a smallest i such
that o ∈ λα+1(ui) = λα(ui), but o ∈ λα(v) and o 6∈ λα+1(v). By minimality
of i, o 6∈ λα+1(uj) for all j ≤ i− 1.
By the contraposition of (2) with ui−1 and ui, knowing that o 6∈ λα+1(ui−1),
it follows that o 6∈ λα(ui−1). By INV3 there is a path π from ui−1 to some
l′ ∈ L such that for all w in π, λα(w) ⊆ λα(ui−1) (⊆ λα(v)). Notice that
o 6∈ λα(w) for all these w since o 6∈ λα(ui−1). The path π′ obtained by
concatenating u1 . . . ui−1 with π is the required path from v for INV3 at
step α + 1. Indeed for all w′ in π′, we have seen that λα(w
′) ⊆ λα(v) and
o /∈ λα+1(w′). Thus λα+1(w′) ⊆ λα(v) \ {o} = λα+1(v).
⊓⊔
Lemma 5. If all three invariants are true for each λβ, β < α, α a limit ordinal,
then they are true for λα.
Proof. Let α be a limit ordinal, and suppose that the three invariants are true
for each ordinal β < α. Given v ∈ V , as the set λβ(v) is finite
11 and the sequence
(λβ(v))β<α is nonincreasing, there exists some γ < α such that λβ(v) = λγ(v)
for all β, γ ≤ β < α. Therefore
λα(v) = ∩β<αλβ(v) = λγ(v). (3)
It immediately follows that INV2 holds at step α. To show that INV3 also holds,
consider a path π from v to some l ∈ L such that λγ(u) ⊆ λγ(v) for all u in
π (by INV3 at step γ). We can take this path π for INV3 at step α since for
all these u, we have λα(u) ⊆ λγ(u) ⊆ λγ(v) = λα(v). Finally, the first invariant
remains true at step α because for all v′ ∈ Succ(v), we have
{o ∈ λα(v′) | mα(v) v o}
⊆ {o ∈ λγ(v′) | mγ(v) v o} since λα(v′) ⊆ λγ(v′) and mγ(v) v mα(v),
⊆ λγ(v) by INV1 at step γ,
= λα(v) by (3).
⊓⊔
To get Theorem 1, it remains to explain how to build a finite-memory weak
SPE σ¯ from the fixed point provided by Lemma 1.
Proof (of Theorem 1). By Lemma 1, we have a fixed point of Remove and Adjust
such that that λα∗(v) 6= ∅ for all v ∈ V . Since λα∗ is unchanged by Adjust, for
all o ∈ λα∗(v), there is a (o, α∗)-labeled path π from v to some l ∈ L with ol = o.
We denote by ρv,o the play πl
ω:
ρv,o = πl
ω. (4)
(*) Recall that µ(ρv,o) = ol, and have in mind that ol ∈ λα∗(u) for all vertices u
in ρv,o.
The construction of σ¯ will be done step by step thanks to a progressive
labeling of the histories by outcomes in OL and by using the plays ρv,o. This
labeling κ : Hist(v0)→ OL will allow to recover from history hv the outcome o
of the play 〈σ¯|h〉v induced by σ¯ in the subgame (G|h, v).
11 This is the place in the proof where finiteness of the number of outcomes is used in
a crucial way.
We start with history v0 and any o0 ∈ λα∗(v0). Consider ρv0,o0 as in (4).
The strategy profile σ¯ is partially built such that 〈σ¯〉v0 = ρv0,o0 . The non empty
prefixes g of ρv0,o0 are all labeled with κ(g) = o0.
At the following steps, we consider a history h′v′ that is not yet labeled, but
such that h′ = hv has already been labeled by κ(hv) = o. The labeling of hv by
o means that σ¯ has already been built to produce the play 〈σ¯|h〉v with outcome
o in the subgame (G|h, v), such that 〈σ¯|h〉v is suffix of ρu,o from some u. By (*)
we have o ∈ λα∗(v). As λα∗ is invariant under Remove (noting o ∈ λα∗(v) and
v′ ∈ Succ(v)), there exists o′ ∈ λα∗(v′) such that
o ⊀v o
′. (5)
With ρv′,o′ as in (4), we then extend the construction of σ¯ such that 〈σ¯|h′〉v′ =
ρv′,o′ , and for each non empty prefix g of ρv′,o′ , we label h
′g by κ(h′g) = o′
(notice that the prefixes of h′ have already been labeled by choice of h′). This
process is iterated to complete the construction of σ¯.
Let us show that the constructed profile σ¯ is a very weak SPE in (G, v0).
Consider a history h′ = hv ∈ Hist(v0) with v ∈ Vi, and a one-shot deviating
strategy σ′i from σi|h in the subgame (G|h, v). Let v
′ be such that σ′i(v) = v
′.
By definition of σ¯, we have κ(hv) = o and κ(h′v′) = o′ such that (5) holds. Let
ρ = 〈σ¯|h〉v and ρ
′ = 〈σ¯|h′〉v′ . Then o = µ(hρ) and o
′ = µ(hvρ′) by (*). By (5), σ′i
is not a profitable deviation for player i. Hence σ¯ is a very weak SPE and thus
a weak SPE by Proposition 1.
It remains to prove that σ¯ is finite-memory by correctly choosing the plays
ρv,o of (4). Fix o ∈ OL and consider the set Uo of vertices v such that o ∈ λα∗(v).
Then we choose the plays ρv,o = πl
ω for all v ∈ Uo, such that the set of associated
finite paths πl forms a tree. Therefore having o in memory, the required Moore
machine can produce positionally each ρv,o with v ∈ Uo. Hence its set M of
states is equal to OL. ⊓⊔
The next corollary is an easy consequence of Theorem 1. Under the same
conditions except perhaps the second one, and when the underlying graph of G
is a tree, it guarantees the existence of a weak SPE that is positional.
Corollary 1. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game with a subset L ⊆ V of leaves12
such that the underlying graph is a tree rooted at v0. If (G, v0) satisfies the first
and third conditions of Theorem 1, then there exists a positional weak SPE in
(G, v0).
Proof. If the second condition of Theorem 1 is not satisfied, we replace the
outcome function µ by a new function µ′ defined as follows. For all plays lω,
with l ∈ L, there is a unique path π from v0 to l as the underlying graph is a
tree. For all suffixes ρ of πlω, we let µ′(ρ) = µ(πlω). For all the remaining plays
ρ, we let µ′(ρ) = µ(ρ). With the new function µ′, the game (G, v0) now satisfies
12 The existence of leaves l with a unique outgoing edge (l, l) is abusive since the graph
is a tree: it should be understood as a unique infinite play from l.
all the conditions of Theorem 1 and has thus a weak SPE σ¯ with respect to µ′.
It is easy to see that σ¯ is also a weak SPE with respect to µ. Notice that this
profile is necessarily positional as the underlying graph is a tree. ⊓⊔
In the next two sections, we present two large families of games for which
there always exists a weak SPE. We will explain how these results are obtained
from Theorem 1 and its Corollary 1. Before that, we demonstrate the argument
establishing Theorem 1 on the game G4 as introduced in Example 3.
Example 4. Let us describe the inductive process for the game G4 of Figure 2
(Page 9). For all i ∈ Π and all steps α, we have λα(li) = {oi}. Table 1 indicates
the different steps until reaching α∗ for the vertices vi, i ∈ Π , with OL =
{o1, o2, o3, o4}. For instance, at step 1, Remove removes o4 from λα(v1) because
o4 ≺1 o′ for all o′ ∈ λα(l1) = {o1}. At step 2, Adjust removes no outcome. For
v = v1 and o ∈ λα(v1), the plays ρv,o are:
ρv1,o1 = v1l
ω
1 , ρv1,o2 = v1v2l
ω
2 , ρv1,o3 = v1v2v3l
ω
3 .
The other vertices v 6= v1 have similar plays ρv,o.
α λα(v1) λα(v2) λα(v3) λα(v4)
0 OL OL OL OL
1 OL \ {o4} OL OL OL
2 OL \ {o4} OL OL OL
3 OL \ {o4} OL \ {o1} OL OL
4 OL \ {o4} OL \ {o1} OL OL
5 OL \ {o4} OL \ {o1} OL \ {o2} OL
6 OL \ {o4} OL \ {o1} OL \ {o2} OL
7 OL \ {o4} OL \ {o1} OL \ {o2} OL \ {o3}
α∗ = 8 OL \ {o4} OL \ {o1} OL \ {o2} OL \ {o3}
Table 1. The different steps until reaching a fixed point for game G4
In the case of game (G4, v1), the construction of a weak SPE σ¯, as described
in the previous proof, leads to the strategy profile of Figure 3. Indeed, the con-
struction of σ¯ begins with history v1 and ρv1,o1 = v1l
ω
1 . At the next step, we
consider history v1v2 and ρv2,o4 = v2v3v4l
ω
4 such that o1 ⊀1 o4, aso. Notice that
the previous proof states a memory size equal to 4 for σ¯ whereas Figure 4 depicts
a Moore machine for σ¯ with a better memory size equal to 3.
4 First application
In this section, we begin with the first application of the results of the previous
section (more particularly Corollary 1): when an initialized game has an outcome
function with finite range, then it always has a weak SPE.
Theorem 2. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game such that the outcome function
has finite range. Then there exists a weak SPE in (G, v0).
Let us comment this theorem. (i) Kuhn’s theorem [19] states that there
always exist an SPE in initialized games played on a finite tree (notice that in
this particular case, the existence of a weak SPE is equivalent to the existence
of an SPE). Theorem 2 can be seen as a generalization of Kuhn’s theorem: if we
keep the outcome set finite, all initialized games (regardless of the underlying
graph and the player set) have weak SPE. (ii) The next theorem is proved in [14]
for outcome functions µ = (µi)i∈Π as presented in Example 1 and has strong
relationship with Theorem 2. Recall that a payoff function µi : Plays → R is
lower-semicontinuous if whenever a sequence of plays (ρn)n∈N converges to a
play ρ = limn→∞ ρn, then lim infn→∞ µi(ρn) ≥ µi(ρ).
Theorem 3 ([14]). Let (G, v0) be an initialized game with a finite set Π of
players and an outcome function µ = (µi)i∈Π such that each µi : Plays→ R has
finite range and is lower-semicontinuous. Then there exists an SPE in (G, v0).
As every weak SPE is an SPE in the case of lower-semicontinuous payoff functions
µi [5], we recover the previous result with our Theorem 2. Even if it is not
explicitly mentioned in [14], a close look at the details of the proof shows that
the authors first show the existence of a weak SPE (without the hypothesis of
lower-semicontinuity) and then show that it is indeed an SPE (thanks to this
hypothesis). The first part of their proof could be replaced by ours, which is
simpler: we remove outcomes from the sets λα(v) (see the proof of Theorem 1)
whereas plays are removed in the inductive process of [14].
4.1 Intermediate results
The proofs of Theorem 2 in this section and Theorem 4 in the next section
require several intermediate results that we now describe. We begin with the
next lemma where the set µ−1({o}), with o ∈ O, is said to be dense in (G, v0) if
for all h ∈ Hist(v0), there exists ρ such that hρ is a play with outcome µ(hρ) = o.
Lemma 6. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game. If for some o ∈ O, the set µ−1({o})
is dense in (G, v0), then there exists a weak SPE with outcome o in (G, v0).
Proof. The construction of a very13 weak SPE σ¯ is done step by step thanks to a
progressive marking of the histories hv ∈ Hist(v0). Let us give the construction
of σ¯. Initially, for history v0, we know by density that there exists ρ0 ∈ Plays(v0)
with outcome o. We partially construct σ¯ such that it produces ρ0, and we mark
each non empty prefix of ρ0. Then we consider a shortest unmarked history hv,
and we choose some ρ ∈ Plays(v) such that µ(hρ) = o (this is possible by
density). We continue the construction of σ¯ such that it produces the play ρ
13 As already done before, we apply Proposition 1. It will be the case in the sequel of
the article without mentioning anymore this proposition.
in (G|h, v), and for each non empty prefix g of ρ, we mark hg (notice that the
prefixes of h have already been marked by choice of h), and so on. In this way, we
get a strategy profile σ¯ in (G, v0) that is a weak SPE because in each subgame
(G|h, v), the play ρ induced by σ¯|h has outcome µ(hρ) = o and each one-shot
deviating strategy in (G|h, v) leads to a play with outcome o. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6 leads to the next two corollaries. The first one states the existence of
a uniform weak SPE in each initialized game (G, v), v ∈ V , when the underlying
graph of G is strongly connected and the outcome function is prefix-independent.
This corollary will provide a first step towards Theorem 4 presented in Section 5;
it is already interesting on its own right.
Corollary 2. Let G be a game such that the underlying graph is strongly con-
nected and the outcome function µ is prefix-independent.
– Then for all realizable outcomes o such that o = µ(ρ) with ρ ∈ Plays(v0),
there exists a weak SPE with outcome o in (G, v0).
– Moreover, there exists a uniform strategy profile σ¯ and an outcome o such
that for all v ∈ V taken as initial vertex, σ¯ is a weak SPE in (G, v) with
outcome o.
Proof. For the first statement, take ρ ∈ Plays(v0) such that o = µ(ρ). By
Lemma 6, it is enough to show that µ−1({o}) is dense in (G, v0) to get a weak
SPE in (G, v0). For all hv ∈ Hist(v0), there exists a path πv0 from v to v0 as
the underlying graph is strongly connected. The play hπρ has outcome equal to
µ(ρ) = o since µ is prefix-independent. Hence µ−1({o}) is dense.
To get the second statement, we need to go further by exhibiting a uniform
weak SPE with the same outcome o independently of the initial vertex v. Take
any simple cycle π0v0 from v0 to v0. Such a cycle exists since the underlying
graph is strongly connected. Let ρ = πω0 and o = µ(ρ) be its outcome. We
partially construct a positional strategy profile σ¯ that produces πω0 (recall that
π0 is simple). Let U be the set of vertices that belong to π0. Then extend the
construction of σ¯ to all v ∈ V \ U in a way to reach U (i.e. the cycle π0)
positionally. We then get the required uniform strategy profile σ¯ with outcome o.
⊓⊔
The second corollary is a generalization of the previous one. It still guarantees
the existence of a uniform weak SPE in all games (G, v), v ∈ V , for graphs
that are not necessarily strongly connected but have bottom strongly connected
components all containing a play induced by a simple cycle and with the same
outcome. This result will be useful in the proof of Theorem 5 in Section 5.
Corollary 3. Let G be a game such that the underlying graph is finite and the
outcome function µ is prefix-independent. Suppose that there exists an outcome
o such that in each bottom strongly connected component C of G, one can find
a play ρC ∈ Plays(v) for some v ∈ C such that µ(ρC) = o and ρC is induced by
a simple cycle. Then there exists a uniform weak SPE with outcome o in (G, v),
for all v ∈ V .
Proof. Let C be the set of bottom strongly connected components of G. The
construction of the strategy profile σ¯ is very close to the one proposed in the
previous proof. We partially construct σ¯ in a way to produce each ρC . This is
possible positionally since each ρC is induced by a simple cycle. Let U be the
set of vertices that belong to ∪C∈CρC . Then extend the construction of σ¯ to all
v ∈ V \ U in a way to reach U positionally. This is possible by definition of C.
The resulting strategy profile σ¯ is uniform and is a weak SPE in each (G, v),
v ∈ V , such that µ(〈σ¯〉v) = o. Indeed each ρC has outcome o and µ is prefix-
independent. ⊓⊔
We end with a last lemma which indicates how to combine different weak
SPEs into one weak SPE. It will be used in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 4.
Lemma 7. Consider an initialized game (G, v0) and a set of vertices L ⊆ V
such that for all hl ∈ Hist(v0) with l ∈ L, the subgame (G|h, l) has a weak
SPE with outcome ohl. Consider another initialized game (G
′, v0) obtained from
(G, v0)
– by replacing all edges (l, v) ∈ E by one edge (l, l), for all l ∈ L,
– and with outcome function µ′ such that for all ρ′ ∈ PlaysG′(v0), µ′(ρ′) = ohl
if ρ′ = hlω with l ∈ L and µ′(ρ′) = µ(ρ′) otherwise.
If (G′, v0) has a weak SPE, then (G, v0) has also a weak SPE.
Proof. Denote by σ¯hl the weak SPE in each (G|h, l), and by σ¯
′ the weak SPE in
(G′, v0). We then build a strategy profile τ¯ in (G, v0) as follows. For player i ∈ Π
and history hv ∈ Histi(v0):
– if no vertex of L occurs in hv, then τi(hv) = σ
′
i(hv);
– otherwise, decompose hv as h1h2v such that the first occurrence of a vertex
l ∈ L is the first vertex of h2. Then τi(hv) = σ
h1l
i (h2v).
Hence in the first case, τi mimics σ
′
i in the game (G
′, v0), and in the second case,
τi mimics σ
h1l in the subgame (G|h1 , l).
Let us show that τ¯ is a weak SPE in (G, v0). Consider any subgame (G|h, v)
such that v ∈ Vi, and any one-shot deviation strategy τ ′i of player i from τ¯|h.
Either no vertex of L occurs in hv, and τ ′i is not profitable for player i because
σ¯′ is a weak SPE in (G′, v0) and by definition of µ
′. Or h = h1h2v such that the
first occurrence of a vertex l ∈ L is the first vertex of h2, and again τ ′i is not
profitable because σ¯h1l is a weak SPE in the subgame (G|h1 , l). ⊓⊔
4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Now that we have established all useful intermediate results for this section and
the next one, we can finally proceed to the proof of Theorem 2. W.l.o.g. we can
suppose that the underlying graph of G is a tree rooted at v0 (by unraveling this
graph from v0). We first show how to transform a game played on an infinite
tree to a game satisfying Conditions 1 and 2 from Theorem 1 while reflecting
weak SPE.
In the following lemma we write h ⊑ l to denote that h is a prefix of l, and
denote by cl(A) the topological closure of A.
Lemma 8. Consider a game played on an infinite tree Cω with countable out-
come set O and outcome function µ : Cω → O. There exists a prefix-free set
L ⊆ C∗ of leaves and an assignment Θ : L→ O such that
1. For each h ∈ C∗ there exists some l ∈ L with h ⊑ l or l ⊑ h.
2. For each l ∈ L we find that µ−1({Θ(l)}) is dense in lCω.
Proof. By iterative use of the Baire Category Theorem.We go through all h ∈ C∗
in some order, add elements to L and extend Θ. Let h ∈ C∗ be the current can-
didate. If we do not yet have added l to L with l ⊑ h or h ⊑ l, then consider
that hCω = hCω ∩
⋃
o∈O µ
−1({o}). As O is countable, the Baire Category Theo-
rem implies that some µ−1({o0}) is somewhere dense, i.e. that there exists some
l ⊒ h such that lCω ⊆ cl
(
µ−1({o0})
)
. We add l to L and set Θ(l) = o0. Then
we proceed to the next h. In the limit, we have constructed L and Θ as desired.
To see that L is prefix-free, assume that there are l1, l2 ∈ L with l1 ⊏ l2. If l1
was added first, and l2 was added when dealing with the history h, then h ⊑ l2.
But as prefixes of a given history are linearly ordered, either h ⊑ l1 or l1 ⊑ h
follows. Thus, we would not have added l2 when dealing with h. If l2 was added
first, and then l1 when dealing with h, then we would find that h ⊑ l1 ⊑ l2, thus
h ⊑ l2, thus we would not have added l2. Hence, L is prefix-free. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Theorem 2). Instead of reasoning with the underlying graph of G, we
work w.l.o.g. with its unraveling from the initial vertex v0.
We can apply Lemma 8 to transform the game. For each leaf, we can apply
Lemma 6 to obtain a weak SPE in the corresponding subgame. Together, the
criteria of Lemma 7 are satisfied. The implication of Lemma 7 is true by Corol-
lary 1, and the conclusion yields the desired statement. ⊓⊔
5 Second application
In this section, we present a second large family of games with a weak SPE,
as another application of the general results of Section 3 (more particularly
Theorem 1). This family is constituted with all games with a finite underlying
graph and a prefix-independent outcome function.
Theorem 4. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game such that the underlying graph
is finite and the outcome function is prefix-independent. Then there exists a weak
SPE in (G, v0).
Let us comment this theorem. (i) It guarantees the existence of a weak SPE
for classical games with quantitative objectives as presented in Example 1, such
that their outcome function is prefix-independent. This is the case of limsup
and mean-payoff payoff functions (and their limit inferior counterparts). Recall
that Example 2 (see also Figure 1) provides a game with no SPE, where the
payoff functions µi can be seen as either limsup or mean-payoff (or their limit
inferior counterparts). (ii) Later in this section, we will show that under the
hypotheses of Theorem 4, there always exists a weak SPE that is finite-memory
(Corollary 4), and we will study in which cases it can be positional or even
uniform (Theorem 5). (iii) The families of games of Theorems 2 and 4 are
incomparable: Boolean reachability games are in the first family but not in the
second one, and mean-payoff games are in the second family but not in the first
one.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4 follows the same structure as for Theorem 2. The idea is
to apply Lemma 7 where L is equal to the union of the bottom strongly connected
components of the graph of G. The weak SPEs required by Lemma 7 exist on
the subgames (G|h, l) with l ∈ L by Corollary 2, and on the game (G
′, v0) thanks
to Theorem 1.
Proof (of Theorem 4). Let C be the set of bottom strongly connected components
of the finite graph of G. By Corollary 2, for all C ∈ C, there exist a uniform
strategy profile σ¯C and a outcome oC such that σ¯C is a weak SPE with outcome
oC in each (G, v) with v ∈ C. Notice that as µ is prefix-independent, σ¯C is also
a weak SPE with outcome oC in all subgames (G|h, v) with hv ∈ Hist(v0) and
v ∈ C.
If the initial vertex v0 belongs to some C ∈ C, then σ¯C is the required weak
SPE in (G, v0) (it is clearly finite-memory as it is uniform). From now on we
suppose that v0 6∈ C for all C ∈ C.
We consider the graph (G′, v0) constructed from (G, v0) as described in
Lemma 7 with L = ∪C∈CC. This graph satisfies all the hypotheses of Theo-
rem 1.
The set L of leaves is the one used for Lemma 7. The first hypothesis holds
because L is the union of the bottom strongly connected components of G. The
second hypothesis holds because µ is prefix-independent. The third hypothesis
holds because V is finite. Therefore, (G′, v0) has a weak SPE σ¯
′ by Theorem 1.
By the existence of the previous strategy profiles σ¯′ and σ¯C , C ∈ C, it follows
by Lemma 7 that there exists a weak SPE τ¯ in (G, v0). ⊓⊔
5.2 Finite-memory weak SPE
We here make the statement of Theorem 4 more precise by guaranteeing the
existence of a weak SPE with finite-memory.
Corollary 4. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game such that the underlying graph is
finite and the outcome function is prefix-independent. Then there exists a finite-
memory weak SPE in (G, v0) with memory size bounded by the number of bottom
strongly connected components of the graph. Moreover, a memory size linear in
the number of bottom components is necessary.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 4, we have constructed a weak SPE τ¯ . Let us
show that τ¯ is a finite-memory strategy profile with memory size bounded by |C|.
Let us first come back to the construction of τ¯ given in the proof of Lemma 7.
Consider player i ∈ Π and history hv ∈ Histi(v0). If no vertex of L occurs in
hv, then τi(hv) = σ
′
i(hv). Otherwise, decompose hv as h1h2v such that the first
occurrence of a vertex l ∈ C ⊆ L is the first vertex of h2, then
τi(hv) = σC,i(v). (6)
Notice that in (6) τi(hv) only depends on C, and not on l ∈ C, since σ¯C is
uniform. Now let us recall the construction of σ¯′ with a memory size |L| given
in the proof of Theorem 1, and in particular to equation (4). In (G′, v0) the
plays ρv,o = πl
ω can be produced positionally while keeping l ∈ L in memory.
Therefore by (6) and as σ¯C is uniform, it follows that the memory size of τ¯ can
be reduced from |L| to |C|.
Let us now prove that there exist games with a finite set V and a prefix-
independent function µ, that require a memory size inO(|C|) for their weak SPEs.
To this end, we come back to the family of gamesGn of Example 3 with n bottom
strongly connected components. Consider the unravelling of Gn from the initial
vertex v1 as depicted in Figure 3 and let us study the form of any weak SPE σ¯ in
(Gn, v1). In all subgames (Gn|h, vi), the induced play cannot be (vivi+1 . . . vi−1)
ω
with outcome ⊥ since each player would have a profitable one-shot deviation.
W.l.o.g let us suppose that σ1(v1) = l1 (player 1 decides to move from v1 to l1
at the root of the unravelling, as in Figure 3). Then the outcome of the play
ρ induced by σ¯|v1 in the subgame (Gn|v1 , v2) is necessarily o1 or on, otherwise
player 1 would have a profitable one-shot deviation in (Gn, v0) (recall that o1 ≺1
oj for all j ∈ Π \{1, n}). The first case o1 cannot occur otherwise player 2 would
have a profitable one-shot deviation in (Gn|v1 , v2) (recall that o1 ≺2 o2). With
similar arguments one can verify that the induced play ρ is necessarily equal to
v2v3 . . . vnl
ω
n with outcome on (as in Figure 3). We can repeat the same reasoning
for the play induced by σ¯|v1v2···vn in the subgame (Gn|v1v2···vn , v1) which must
be equal to v1v2 . . . vn−1l
ω
n−1 with outcome on−1, aso. Hence all weak SPEs of
(Gn, v1) have the form of the one described in Figure 3 and they have finite
memory of size n− 1 as explained previously in Example 3 (see also Figure 4).
Let us show that such a weak SPE σ¯ cannot have a memory size < n − 1.
Assume the contrary: wlog consider the previous weak SPE σ¯ (as in Figure 3)
and in particular a Moore machine M = (M,m0, αU , αN ) encoding σ1 such
that |M | < n − 1. Let hjv1, j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} be consecutive histories, with
hj = (v1v2 · · · vn)j . On one hand, we have σ1(hjv1) = αN (α̂U (m0, hj), v1) for
all j. On the other hand, σ1(h0v1) = σ1(hn−1v1) = l1 and σ1(hjv1) = v2 for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2}. Therefore there exists j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2}, j1 6= j2, such
that the associated memory state is identical, i.e, α̂U (m0, hj1) = α̂U (m0, hj2).
Thus M enters into a cycle while reading the prefixes of (v1v2 · · · vn)ω . This
means that M defines σ1(hv) = v2 for all histories h of which h1 is prefix, in
contradiction with σ1(hn−1v1) = l1. ⊓⊔
5.3 Positional weak SPE
In the previous section, Corollary 4 guarantees the existence of a finite-memory
weak SPE for games with a finite underlying graph and a prefix-independent
outcome function. In this section, we identify conditions on the preference rela-
tions of the players, as expressed in the next lemma, that guarantee the existence
of a uniform weak SPE (see Theorem 5).
Lemma 9 (Lemma 4 of [21]). Let O be a non empty set of outcomes. Let
≺i be a preference relation over O, for all i ∈ Π. The following assertions are
equivalent.
– For all i, i′ ∈ Π and all o, p, q ∈ O, we have ¬(o ≺i p ≺i q ∧ q ≺i′ o ≺i′ p).
– There exist a partition {Ok}k∈K of O and a linear order < over K such that
• k < k′ implies o ≺i o′ for all i ∈ Π, o ∈ Ok and o′ ∈ Ok′ ,
• ≺i|Ok = ≺i′ |Ok or ≺i|Ok = (≺i′ |Ok)
−1 for all i, i′ ∈ Π.
In the previous lemma, we call each setOk a layer. The second assertion states
that (i) if k < k′ then all outcomes in Ok′ are preferred to all outcomes in Ok by
all players, and (ii) inside a layer, any two players have either the same preference
relations or the inverse preference relations. When a set of outcomes satisfies the
conditions of Lemma 9, we say that it is layered. In [21], the author characterizes
the preference relations that always yield SPE in games with outcome functions
in the Hausdorff difference hierarchy of the open sets. One condition is that the
set of outcomes is layered.
Theorem 5. Let G be a game with a finite underlying graph and such that the
outcome function is prefix-independent with a layered set O of outcomes. Then
there exists a uniform weak SPE in (G, v), for all v ∈ V .
Example 5. Remember the class Gn of games, n ≥ 3, of Example 3, such that
O = {o1, . . . , on,⊥} and each player i has a preference relation ≺i satisfying
⊥ ≺i oi−1 ≺i oi ≺i oj for all j ∈ Π \ {i − 1, i}. This set of outcomes is not
layered because the first assertion of Lemma 9 is not satisfied. Indeed we have
o2 ≺3 o3 ≺3 o1 ∧ o1 ≺2 o2 ≺2 o3.
Recall that in the proof of Corollary 4 we have shown that all weak SPEs of Gn
require a memory size in O(n). Hence the hypothesis of Theorem 5 about the
preference relations is not completely dispensable.
Let us proceed to the proof of Theorem 5. Let C be the set of the bottom
strongly connected components of the finite underlying graph of G. For each
C ∈ C, we fix a play ρC ∈ Plays(v) for some v ∈ C induced by a simple cycle.
The set OC = {oC | oC = µ(ρC), C ∈ C} is finite. It is layered by hypothesis with
a finite partition into layers {Ok}k∈K . The proof of Theorem 5 is by induction
on the number of layers and uses the next lemma dealing with one layer.
Lemma 10. Suppose that |K| = 1, then there exists a uniform strategy profile σ¯
that is a weak SPE in each (G, v), v ∈ V , such that µ(〈σ¯〉v) = oC for some C ∈ C.
The proof of this lemma is by induction on |OC |. The case of only one outcome
is solved by Corollary 3. When they are several outcomes in OC , we will show how
to decompose G into two subgames G′ and G′′ such that the bottom strongly
connected component of G′ (resp. G′′) are those components C ∈ C of G such
that oC = o for some o (resp. oC ∈ OC \ {o}). By Corollary 3 for G
′ and by
induction hypothesis for G′′, we will get two uniform weak SPEs that can be
merged to get a uniform weak SPE for G.
Proof (of Lemma 10). The proof is by induction on |OC |. We solve the basic
case |OC | = 1 by Corollary 3. Suppose that |OC | = n > 1. By Lemma 9, we have
≺i=≺i′ or ≺i=≺
−1
i′ for all i, i
′ ∈ Π . We can thus merge the players into two
meta-players P1 and P2 with their respective preference relations ≺1, ≺2 on OC
satisfying o1 ≺1 o2 ≺1 . . . ≺1 on and on ≺2 on−1 ≺2 . . . ≺2 o1. Notice that P2
could not exist.
For the sequel, we need the classical concept of attractor of U ⊆ V for P1 [17]:
it is the set Attr1(U) composed of all v ∈ V from which P1 can force, against
P2, to reach U . More precisely, Attr1(U) is constructed by induction as follows:
Attr1(U) = ∪k≥0Xk such that
X0 = U,
Xk+1 = Xk ∪ {v ∈ V | v is controlled by P1 and ∃(v, v
′) ∈ E, v′ ∈ Xk}
∪ {v ∈ V | v is controlled by P2 and ∀(v, v
′) ∈ E, v′ ∈ Xk}.
Let C′ = {C ∈ C | oC = on} and C
′′ = C \ C′. We construct a subset V ′ of V
as follows:
1. Initially V ′ ← ∪{C | C ∈ C′}
2. V ′ ← Attr1(V ′). Let D be the set of bottom strongly connected components
of G|V \V ′
3. If D contains components not in C′′, then add all of them to V ′ and goto 2,
else stop
At the end of the process, we get two sets V ′ and V ′′ = V \ V ′, and the related
subgames G′ and G′′ respectively induced by V ′ and V ′′.
Let us prove by induction on the three steps that (*) for all v ∈ V ′, there is
a path from v to some C ∈ C′. To this end, we denote W = Attr1(V ′) at step 2
and T = W
⋃
∪{D ∈ D | D 6∈ C} at step 3. After step 1, (*) is true (with the
empty path from v to v). It is also the case after step 2, since by definition of
the attractor, there is a path from v ∈ W = Attr1(V
′) to some v′ ∈ V ′ for which
there is a path to some C ∈ C′ by induction hypothesis. Consider now v ∈ D
such that D ∈ D is added to W in step 3. As D does not belong to C′′ and D
is a bottom component of G|V \W , then there must exist a path from v ∈ D to
some C ∈ C′ and (*) holds.
By construction each C ∈ C′ (resp. C ∈ C′′) is a bottom strongly connected
component of G′ (resp. G′′). Let us prove that neither G′ nor G′′ contain other
bottom components. Assume the contrary and let v be a vertex belonging to
such a bottom component D. By step 3 of the previous process, v cannot belong
to V ′′. By (*), v cannot belong to V ′. Therefore the set of bottom strongly
connected components of G′ and G′′ is equal to C.
By Corollary 3 for G′ and by induction hypothesis for G′′, there exist two
uniform strategy profiles σ¯′ and σ¯′′ respectively on G′ and G′′ such that σ¯′ (resp.
σ¯′′) is a weak SPE in each (G′, v′), v′ ∈ V ′ (in each (G′′, v′′), v′′ ∈ V ′′). Moreover
µ(〈σ¯′〉v′ ) = on and µ(〈σ¯′′〉v′′) ∈ PC \ {on}. The required uniform strategy profile
σ¯ on G is built such that σ¯|V ′ = σ¯
′ and σ¯|V ′′ = σ¯
′′. Let us show that it is a weak
SPE in all (G, v), v ∈ V . Consider first a subgame (G|h, v
′) such that 〈σ¯|h〉v′ is a
play in G′ and a one-shot deviating strategy using an edge (v′, v′′) with v′ ∈ V ′
and v′′ ∈ V ′′. By step 2 (i.e. by definition of the attractor), v′ belongs to P1 who
has no incentive to use (v′, v′′) since the deviating play goes to G′′ for which P1
receives an outcome om such that om ≺1 on. Consider next a subgame (G|h, v
′′)
such that 〈σ¯|h〉v′′ is a play in G
′′ and a one-shot deviating strategy using an
edge (v′′, v′) with v′ ∈ V ′ and v′′ ∈ V ′′. By step 2, v′′ now belongs to P2 who
has no incentive to use (v′′, v′) since he will receive an outcome om such that
on ≺2 om. ⊓⊔
We can now proceed to the proof of Theorem 5, which is by induction on the
number of layers of O. The case of one layer is treated in Lemma 10. In case of
several layers, we show in the proof how to decompose G into two subgames G′
and G′′ such that there is only one layer in G′ and less layers in G′′ than in G.
From the two uniform weak SPEs obtained for G′ by Lemma 10 and for G′′ by
induction hypothesis, we construct the required uniform weak SPE for G.
Proof (of Theorem 5). We will prove the theorem by induction on the number
of layers and additionally show that for all v ∈ V , µ(〈σ¯〉v) = oC for some C ∈ C.
Let O′ ⊆ OC be the highest layer of OC (with respect to the linear order < over
K).
If O′ = OC , then there is only one layer and the required uniform strategy
profile follows from Lemma 10.
If O′ ⊂ OC , we define V ′ ⊂ V composed of all vertices v for which there exists
a path from v to some component C ∈ C such that oC ∈ O′ (in particular V ′
includes all such components), and we let V ′′ = V \V ′. We obtain two subgames
G′ and G′′ respectively induced by V ′ and V ′′. By construction of V ′, one easily
checks that the union of the bottom strongly connected components of G′ and
G′′ is equal to C. Hence, G′ has only one layer (equal to O′) and G′′ has one
layer less than G. It follows (by Lemma 10 and by induction hypothesis) the
existence of two strategy profiles σ¯′ and σ¯′′ respectively on G′ and G′′: σ¯′ is a
uniform weak SPE in each (G′, v′), v′ ∈ V ′, such that µ(〈σ¯′〉v′) ∈ O′, and σ¯′′ is
a uniform weak SPE in each (G′′, v′′), v′′ ∈ V ′′, such that µ(〈σ¯′′〉v′′ ) ∈ O \ O′.
The required strategy profile σ¯ on G is built such that σ¯|V ′ = σ¯
′ and σ¯|V ′′ = σ¯
′′.
As in the proof of Lemma 10, we consider crossing edges between G′ and G′′.
By construction, there is no edge (v′′, v′) with v′ ∈ V ′ and v′′ ∈ V ′′ showing
that a play starting in G′′ remains in G′′. On the contrary, there exist edges
(v′, v′′) with v′ ∈ V ′ and v′′ ∈ V ′′, but no player has an incentive to use them
in a one-shot deviating strategy since the resulting outcome is in a layer smaller
than O′. Therefore, σ¯ is a weak SPE in each (G, v). ⊓⊔
6 A counterexample for countably many players and
outcomes
We proceed to give an example of a game without weak SPE. It shows that the
requirement of only finitely many leaf-outcomes is not dispensable in Theorem 1
or Theorem 2. In [14, Section 4.3] there is an example of a game in extensive form
with countably many players, uncountably many outcomes, preference heights
3, but without weak SPE. Our example is similar, but with only countably
many outcomes, one single proper infinite play (i.e. not ending in a leaf), and
preferences of height 3.
Example 6. We consider the initialized game (G, v0) of Figure 5. The set of
players is N. The player i acts at most once, at the vertex vi, and can either
enter the leaf li or move onwards to vi+1. The play starts with player 0 at v0.
The outcome attached to reaching li is denoted by 2
i1ω, the outcome attached
to the infinite path v0v1v2 . . . is denoted by 0
ω. The preferences of player i are
given by p ≺i q iff p(i) < q(i).
The game (G, v0) has no SPE. To prove this statement, it is enough to show
that there is no very weak SPE by Proposition 1 and since every player only
acts one. Assume by contradiction that there exists a very weak SPE σ¯. In each
subgame (G|h, vi), the play induced by σ¯ cannot be the one with outcome 0
ω.
Otherwise player i has a profitable one-shot deviating strategy by moving to
leaf li (by increasing his payoff from 0 to 1). Therefore, for all k, there exists a
player i ≥ k who moves to leaf li. Let i be the first such player. It follows that
in (G|h, vi), he can increase his payoff from 1 to 2 by moving to vi+1 instead to
li, contradiction.
v0
1ω v1
2 · 1ω v2
22 · 1ω v3
222 · 1ω
0ω
Fig. 5. A game with no weak SPE
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